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NOTE
Sidestepping Scott: Modifying Criminal
Discovery in Alaska
This Note analyzes the possibility of instituting reciprocal criminal
discovery in Alaska.  It begins by discussing the right against self-
incrimination under federal and Alaska law and then traces the
national trend expanding the exchange of information between the
prosecution and defense through mandatory reciprocal discovery
statutes.  Next, the Note analyzes Scott v. State, the case in which
the Alaska Supreme Court held that discovery requests by the
prosecution which are testimonial, incriminating, and compelled
violate the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.  In light of
the Scott holding, the Note discusses several failed and ineffective
attempts to reform criminal discovery in Alaska, looks to several
other states’ reciprocal discovery systems, and concludes that an
opt-in reciprocal discovery system would be the best option to ex-
pand criminal discovery in Alaska.
I. INTRODUCTION
While the rest of the nation has moved gradually toward ex-
panded criminal discovery,1 the State of Alaska remains behind.
The national move has embraced various forms of reciprocal dis-
covery, which provides for the liberal exchange of information be-
tween the prosecution and the defense.2  In its purest form, recip-
Copyright © 1998 by Alaska Law Review
1. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter 1996 STANDARDS].  In
1994, the American Bar Association adopted Criminal Justice Discovery Stan-
dards reflecting a significant change from previous standards.  The ABA noted
that “since the adoption of the Second Edition Standards, both state and federal
criminal justice systems have continued the trend towards imposing expanded
pretrial discovery obligations on the prosecution and the defense in criminal
cases.”  Id. at xv.  The new standards removed a “two-track” approach that
“combined limited mandatory discovery with broad additional discovery at the
election of the defense” in favor of an approach that applied mandatory discovery
in all cases.  Id. at xvi.  The State of Alaska has not adopted this approach.
2. States that have enacted some form of reciprocal discovery include Ari-
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rocal discovery is a “two-way street” wherein the parties exchange
before trial virtually all information short of the attorneys’ work
product.  A modified form of reciprocal discovery often referred to
as “opt-in” reciprocal discovery provides greater discovery to the
prosecution but only if the defendant chooses to participate.  The
growing acceptance of reciprocal discovery reflects a concern for
fair criminal trials.  Generally, without reciprocal discovery, the
defense has access to more information than does the prosecution,
which directly hinders the prosecution from putting on as strong a
case as possible.  Reciprocal discovery systems aim to rectify this
imbalance by providing the prosecution with greater discovery ac-
cess to the defendant’s information.3
Alaskan jurisprudence has never adopted any form of recipro-
cal discovery.  Impeded by the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in
Scott v. State,4 mandatory disclosures by the defendant have been
curtailed to such an extent that true reciprocal discovery is impos-
sible.5  The legislative attempt to enact reciprocal discovery was ul-
timately unsuccessful because the reform initiative, Chapter 95,
was found to violate the Scott holding and was therefore ruled un-
constitutional by the Alaska Supreme Court in November of 1997.6
A judicial committee initiative to expand criminal discovery does
not reach the level of traditional reciprocal discovery and has yet
to be tested in Alaska courts.
At the heart of the debate in Alaska is how the legislature
may expand criminal discovery between the prosecution and the
defense while remaining consistent with the Scott holding.  This
Note suggests that an “opt-in” reciprocal discovery system is desir-
able for its fairness and even-handed application of the law while
still respecting the Scott holding.  The passage of legislation in the
Alaska legislature (although later found unconstitutional) indi-
cates popular support exists for such discovery reform.  Part II of
the Note provides a historical background of the right against self-
                                                                                                                                
zona, California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, and West Virginia.  For example, see CAL. PENAL CODE §§
1054 - 1054.7 (West 1997).  See People v. Johnson, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652 (Ct. App.
1992) (stating that the criminal discovery statute “is intended to protect the public
interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts, to promote the [p]eople’s
interest in preventing a last minute defense, and to reduce the risk of judgments
based on incomplete facts”).  For a more complete examination of other jurisdic-
tions, see infra Parts II.B & V.B.
3. For a comprehensive view of the arguments concerning the expansion of
defendant-provided discovery, see Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the De-
fense: Tilting the Adversary Balance, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1986).
4. 519 P.2d 774, 778 (Alaska 1974).
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See State v. Summerville, 948 P.2d 469, 470 (Alaska 1997).
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incrimination and examines models of expanded criminal discov-
ery.  Part III analyzes the Scott holding, focusing on the constitu-
tional difficulties any reciprocal discovery system will face in
Alaska.  Part IV introduces past Alaskan judicial and legislative
attempts to modify criminal discovery, analyzes their conflict with
the Scott holding, and examines and critiques the version of Crimi-
nal Rule 16 currently in effect.  Part V looks to other jurisdictions
for models of reciprocal discovery that would still satisfy the Scott
holding and concludes that an “opt-in” regime is the most appro-
priate way for Alaska to reform criminal discovery.
II. NEMO TENETUR SEIPSUM PRODERE7: EVOLVING STATE
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION
Few rights in the Western legal tradition have as prominent
and erratic a history as the right against self-incrimination.  From
the courts of the Anglican Church to the proceedings of the Star
Chamber, legal authorities and scholars have debated the extent to
which persons should be compelled to testify against their own in-
terests.8  During the founding of our nation, George Mason lob-
bied the Constitutional Convention to include in the original Con-
stitution a bill of rights that would have embraced protections
against self-incrimination, modeled after rights already guaranteed
under the Virginia constitution.9  When Mason’s efforts failed,
James Madison, in the 1789 Congress, supported calls to establish a
right against self-incrimination in any context, including civil mat-
ters.10  In its final form, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.”11  Article I, section 9 of the Alaska
Constitution contains virtually identical language.12  The Alaska
Supreme Court has recognized that the drafters of the Alaska
Constitution looked to the federal Constitution as a model, in-
tending section 9 to guarantee the liberties then available under
the U.S. Constitution.13
7. No one is bound to betray himself.
8. For a full discussion on the history of the right against self-incrimination,
see MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 1-23 (1980); LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE
AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 9-19 (1959).
9. See BERGER, supra note 8, at 22-23.
10. See id.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be compelled in any
criminal proceeding to be a witness against himself.”); see also Biele v. State, 371
P.2d 811 (Alaska 1962).
13. See State v. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526, 529-30 (Alaska 1993).
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The right against self-incrimination however is not the only
protection against governmental abuse afforded the accused.  The
accused citizen also is entitled to a fair, meaningful trial as a matter
of due process.14  Inherent to a meaningful trial is access to infor-
mation, particularly the defendant’s access to the prosecutor’s in-
formation through discovery.15  Protection from self-incrimination
and the assurance of a fair trial often act in concert with each
other, ensuring the accused a fair, informed adjudication.  How
these constitutional protections delimit the process of criminal dis-
covery, however, is far from a determined and static concept in
American jurisprudence.  In particular, the amount of discovery
that the defense must disclose to the state is an evolving debate.
Difficulties arise when important liberties, such as the right
against self-incrimination, operate in varying degrees and on mul-
tiple standards.  The Tenth Amendment to the federal Constitu-
tion includes a truism regarding sovereignty for the states: “powers
not delegated to the United States, . . . nor prohibited by it to the
[s]tates, are reserved to the [s]tates respectively, or to the peo-
ple.”16  The Bill of Rights was originally intended to preclude fed-
eral interference with protected rights.17  Thus, the states were lim-
ited only to the extent that similar provisions were written into
their individual state constitutions.  However, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process clause, enacted during Reconstruction,
has been interpreted to apply most provisions to the states; this in-
corporation has continued gradually until nearly all liberties found
in the Bill of Rights have been applied to the states.18
To the extent that a federal right has been extended to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal courts’ in-
terpretation of the right becomes a baseline, or a bare minimum
amount of protection that the states must provide.  However, a
higher standard may be adopted by states if they so choose.19  In
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
15. See Maloney v. State, 667 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).  For a
comprehensive discussion of the prosecutorial disclosure duties, see Emily D.
Quinn, Standards of Materiality Governing the Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose
Evidence to the Defense, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 147 (1989).
16. U.S. CONST. amend X.
17. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833) (holding that
the federal Constitution’s Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments have no applica-
tion to state governments).
18. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).  For a more detailed account of the incorporation doctrine’s
progression and expansion, see William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
19. See California v. Trombletta, 467 U.S. 479, 491 n.12 (1984) (“[States] re-
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essence, the states may extend greater rights to their respective
citizens if they find the federal baseline to be insufficient.  Many
consider an expansion of rights at a state level consistent with, if
not vital to, the concept of federalism.20 When a state elects to ex-
pand its citizens’ rights beyond the federal baseline, it must then
decide to what extent it will rely upon federal judicial decisions in
interpreting the state’s constitutional stance.21
Criminal discovery is an example of this melange of federal
baselines and state expansion of rights.  In the early 1970s, the
criminal justice system began to experience a revolution of sorts,
particularly as to the rights of the accused.22  During that time, the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) adopted and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure codified different versions of recipro-
cal discovery.  While the ABA Discovery Standards did not insist
upon the defendant’s participation, it provided for an opt-in com-
ponent that permitted broader disclosure from the prosecution to
the defendant only if the defendant agreed to reciprocate with
similar disclosure.23  The revised Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure specifically sought to expand defense disclosure by mandating
reciprocal discovery.24  The defendant had no choice in discovery
                                                                                                                                
main free to adopt more rigorous safeguards governing the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence than those imposed by the [f]ederal Constitution.”).  Alaskan courts
long have viewed themselves as capable of expanding rights beyond U.S. constitu-
tional constraints: “We are not bound in expounding the Alaska Constitution’s
Declaration of Rights by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, past
or future, which expound identical or closely similar provisions of the United
States Constitution.”  Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1969).
20. See generally, e.g., Brennan, supra note 18; Peter J. Galie, Other Supreme
Court Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731
(1982); Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last Frontier,” Professor Gardner:
Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA
L. REV. 1 (1995).
21. See generally Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970)
(analyzing the scope of the right to jury trial under the U.S. and Alaska constitu-
tions).  The Alaska Supreme Court has taken the view that it has a “duty to move
forward in those areas of constitutional progress which we view as necessary to
the development of a civilized way of life in Alaska.”  Id. at 401.  Quoting Justice
Cardozo, the court stated, “‘We take a false and one-sided view of history when
we ignore its dynamic aspects. . . .  [Books] cannot teach us that what was the be-
ginning shall also be the end.’”  Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAW 104-05 (1924)).
22. See FED R. CRIM. P. 16 note to 1974 Amendment; AMERICAN BAR ASS’N,
STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
(Approved Draft, 1970) [hereinafter 1970 STANDARDS].
23. See 1970 STANDARDS, supra note 22, at 43-46.
24. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 note to 1974 Amendment.  The new amendments
revised the rule “to give greater discovery to both the prosecution and the de-
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format.  In both systems, however, the goal was fairer, more bal-
anced discovery under which constitutional rights were preserved,
and the government received the information it needed to prose-
cute the defendant fully and fairly.
Various states adopted aspects of this new view of discovery,
and some states began to push beyond the federal norms.  For ex-
ample, the State of Florida required that defendants give notice of
an alibi defense.25  Although the federal rules did not require the
disclosure of alibi witnesses, in a challenge to the constitutionality
of the Florida rule, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute
against a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege.26  Elsewhere, states
continued to expand discovery requirements, a movement that
culminated in the ABA revising its Discovery Standards to support
full, mandatory reciprocal discovery in criminal cases.27
A. ABA Standards for Reciprocal Discovery
The standards set by the ABA were designed to form the
framework around which the individual states could structure their
own rules.  In drafting the new standards, the ABA “sought to
produce a revised set of standards that would be widely imple-
mented across the United States” and adaptable to each jurisdic-
tion’s particular situation.28  In its purest form, the reciprocal dis-
covery now advanced by the ABA requires equal participation by
the prosecution and defense; it is viewed as a two-way street
whereby information flows freely between the parties.  All infor-
mation, short of work product, is revealed in the pretrial phase,
thus allowing full preparation by each side.
Specifically, the Discovery Standards require the prosecutor
to produce “[a]ll written and oral statements of the defendant or of
any codefendant that are within the possession or control of the
prosecution,”29 as well as “[t]he names and addresses of all persons
known to the prosecution to have information concerning the of-
fense charged, together with all written statements of any such per-
son.”30  The prosecution must also provide (1) “[a]ny reports or
written statements of experts made in connection with the case”31;
                                                                                                                                
fense.”  Id.  The Advisory Committee felt “that the two — prosecution and de-
fense discovery — are related and that the giving of a broader right of discovery
to the defense is dependent upon giving also a broader right of discovery to the
prosecution.”  Id.
25. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a).
26. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
27. See 1996 STANDARDS, supra note 1.
28. Id. at xv.
29. Id. § 11-2.1(a)(i).
30. Id. § 11-2.1(a)(ii).
31. Id. § 11-2.1(a)(iv).
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(2) a list of persons it intends to call as witnesses at trial32; (3) all
tangible objects pertaining to the case, identifying which of these
objects it intends to offer as evidence at trial and which objects it
obtained through a search and seizure33; and (4) all prior conviction
records, information relating to lineups, and information obtained
from electronic surveillance.34  Finally, if “the prosecution intends
to use character, reputation, or other act evidence, the prosecution
should notify the defense of that intention and of the substance of
the evidence to be used.”35
The Discovery Standards likewise demand specific disclosures
from the defense.  Under the new standards, the defendant must
provide the following:
[t]he names and addresses of all witnesses (other than the defen-
dant) whom the defense intends to call at trial, together with all
written statements of any such witness that are within the pos-
session or control of the defense and that relate to the subject
matter of the testimony of the witness.36
The defense must also provide “reports or written statements
made in connection with the case by experts whom the defense in-
tends to call at trial, including the results of physical or mental ex-
aminations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons.”37
Additionally, tangible items that will be introduced at trial by the
defense must be disclosed to the prosecution.38
B. California as a Reciprocal Model
As previously noted, many states have enacted reciprocal dis-
covery statutes.39  An illustrative example is Chapter 10 of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code.40  The stated purpose of the California recipro-
32. See id. § 11-2.1(a)(ii).
33. See id. § 11-2.1(a)(v), (d).
34. See id. § 11-2.1(a)(vi)-(vii), (c).
35. Id. § 11-2.1(b).
36. Id. § 11-2.2(a)(i).
37. Id. § 11-2.2(a)(ii).
38. See id. § 11-2.2(a)(iii).
39. See supra note 2.
40. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054 -1054.7 (West 1997).  Chapter 10 was added by
Initiative Measure § 23 (Proposition 115), which was approved on June 5, 1990.
Like Alaska, California was prohibited from enacting reciprocal discovery by an
expansion of state self-incrimination rights under In re Misener, 698 P.2d 637 (Cal.
1985).  Rather than selecting an opt-in provision, Proposition 115 attempted to
circumvent the court’s decision by including an amendment to the state constitu-
tion that permitted reciprocal discovery.  See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1054 -1054.7.
The California Supreme Court found no conflict between the new amendment
and the existing self-incrimination provisions and upheld Proposition 115.  See
Izazaga v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 304, 313-14 (Cal. 1991).
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cal discovery statute is to “promote the ascertainment of truth in
trials by requiring timely pretrial discovery . . . [t]o save court time
in trial and avoid the necessity for frequent interruptions and post-
ponements. . . . [and] [t]o protect victims and witnesses from dan-
ger, harassment, and undue delay of the proceedings.”41  The Cali-
fornia statute addresses these goals by first listing with specificity
those materials that the prosecuting attorney must disclose.  The
required disclosures include the following:
(a) The names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends
to call as witnesses at trial.
(b) Statements of all defendants.
(c) All relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the
investigation of the offenses charged.
(d) The existence of a felony conviction of any material witness
whose credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the
trial.
(e) Any exculpatory evidence.
(f) Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or re-
ports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor in-
tends to call at trial . . . .42
The defense is also required to produce discovery, but with
less specificity.  The defendant’s disclosures include a list of per-
sons intended to be called “as witnesses at trial”43 accompanied by
all “relevant written or recorded statements of those persons . . .
including any reports or statements of experts made in connection
with the case.”44  The defense must also provide “[a]ny real evi-
dence that the defendant intends to offer in evidence at trial.”45
The California statute is a typical compelled reciprocal dis-
covery system.  The defense does not have the choice of opting-in,
but is required to participate in discovery.  Section 1054 provides
time limits within which counsel must make the required discovery
available.46  The section also protects work product,47 and applies
various sanctions if requests for compliance are unheeded.48  In re-
turn, the defendant is granted much more disclosure than required
by the U.S. Constitution.
As is to be expected, the precise form of a criminal discovery
rule will vary depending on the structure and preferences of each
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.
42. Id. § 1054.1.
43. Id. § 1054.3(a).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 1054.3(b).
46. See id. § 1054.7.
47. See id. § 1054.6.
48. See id. § 1054.5.
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jurisdiction.  Any form of required reciprocal discovery in Alaska,
however, faces serious restrictions, largely due to an unprece-
dented expansion of self-incrimination rights established by the
Alaska Supreme Court in Scott v. State.49
III. THE IMPEDIMENT TO RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY IN ALASKA:
SCOTT V. STATE
In many respects, Alaska has been a forerunner in granting
individual rights above and beyond federal requirements.50  Broad
interpretations of the Alaska Constitution have expanded the right
of privacy,51 the right against unreasonable search and seizure,52
and the accused’s right to counsel.53  However, many have criti-
cized the lack of Alaskan forays into expanding protections against
self-incrimination.54  While these criticisms are valid to a certain
49. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
50. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 11.  Nelson illustrates Alaskan examples of
“New Judicial Federalism” in the areas of equal protection, privacy, religious
freedom, and access to natural resources.  See id.  The Nelson article criticizes
claims made by James Gardner that suggest federalism has produced “a vast
wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronounce-
ments.”  James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761, 763 (1992).
The foundation for such judicial behavior may be traced back at least to Baker v.
City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).  There, the court stated that,
while we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards imposed
upon us by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop
additional constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitu-
tion. . . .  We need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for constitu-
tional direction from the highest court of the land. Instead, we should be
moving concurrently to develop and expound the principles embedded
in our constitutional law.
Id. at 401-02 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
51. As opposed to the federal “zones of privacy,” which rest within penum-
bras from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, as expressed by
the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1965), the
Alaska Constitution specifically provides that “[t]he right of the people to privacy
is recognized and shall not be infringed.” ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
52. See, e.g.,  Jackson v. State, 791 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1990) (limiting pat-
down, warrantless searches and thus rejecting the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)); Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727
(Alaska 1979) (expanding limits on preincarceration searches); Woods & Rhode,
Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977) (extending search and seizure protec-
tions to commercial property).
53. See Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342-43 (Alaska 1969) (interpreting the
Alaska constitutional provision, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11, to have a broader
scope than the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
54. See generally G. Blair McCune, Self-Incrimination Protection Under the
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extent, they underestimate the significance of the broad expansion
of rights under Scott v. State.55
In Scott, the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed a superior
court’s order that had granted the prosecution’s request for ex-
tremely broad discovery.56  Stepping far beyond the discovery re-
quirements of Criminal Rule 16(c),57 the state had required that the
defendant disclose
(1) the names and addresses of all prospective defense witnesses,
other than defendant himself.
(2) the production or inspection and copying of any written or
recorded statements in defendant’s possession of prospective de-
fense or government witnesses, other than defendant himself.
(3) advance notice of an alibi defense, together with information
indicating the place or places defendant claims to have been and
the names of witnesses upon whom he intends to rely.58
The supreme court found that the trial court’s order was
within the broad latitude “accorded a trial court in the conduct and
management of pretrial procedures,”59 but then focused on what
the court considered the most serious claim — “that the broad
prosecutorial discovery order controvene[d] [the defendant’s]
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sec-
tion 9 of the Alaska [C]onstitution.”60
After an extensive review of the evolution of criminal discov-
ery in the United States and in Alaska,61 the court ruled that an ac-
cused could not be compelled to disclose evidence related to an
alibi defense, including the names and addresses of potential wit-
nesses or statements by those witnesses.62  However, the court did
permit the state to require defendants to give pretrial notification
that they might present an alibi defense.63
In its decision, the court relied not on the Fifth Amendment to
                                                                                                                                
Alaska Constitution: A Descriptive Analysis, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 43 (1995).
McCune criticizes Alaskan efforts in, inter alia, the areas of right to counsel, cus-
tody, Miranda waivers, voluntariness, and interrogation.  See id. at 58-69.  In these
areas, McCune suggests, “Alaska courts are generally reluctant to grant broader
protection for self-incrimination rights under the Alaska Constitution than that
afforded by the [f]ederal Constitution.”  Id. at 58.
55. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
56. See id. at 775.
57. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c).
58. Scott, 519 P.2d at 775.
59. Id. at 777.
60. Id. (footnotes omitted).
61. See id. at 778-83.
62. See id. at 786-87.
63. See id. at 787.
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the U.S. Constitution, but on article I, section 9 of the Alaska Con-
stitution.  Divergence from federal construction was necessary due
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Williams v. Florida.64  The
Williams Court, judging facts similar to those of Scott, ruled that
the U.S. Constitution does not provide protection against disclos-
ing alibi witnesses.65  The Supreme Court stated that a trial is “not
yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always
to conceal their cards until played.”66  Focusing on the inevitable
disclosure of the discovery items, the Court noted that the criminal
rules “only compel[] [a defendant] to accelerate the timing of his
disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information
that the [defendant] from the beginning planned to divulge at
trial.”67  With  respect  to the Fifth Amendment, the Court held
that “[n]othing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defen-
dant . . . to await the end of the [s]tate’s case before announcing
the nature of his defense.”68
The Alaska Supreme Court refused to apply the Williams
holding to self-incrimination rights enumerated under article I,
section 9 of the Alaska Constitution.69  In rejecting the reasoning of
Williams, the court held that “the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination under the Alaska Constitution prohibits extensive
pretrial prosecutorial discovery in criminal proceedings.”70  The
court applied a three-part test, disallowing discovery of informa-
tion that is (1) testimonial, (2) incriminating, and (3) compelled.71
Applying this test to Mr. Scott’s situation, the court first found that
the discovery was indeed testimonial since the witness list
“constitutes a communication of cognizable information from one
source to another.”72  Second, the disclosure was also incriminating
to the extent that the released alibi information may reference
“known felons, perjurers, accomplices, co-defendants, or individu-
als under suspicion or surveillance . . . .  Moreover, the police may
possess additional incriminating information about some of the
witnesses and an accused’s reference . . . may tend to implicate him
64. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
65. See id. at 83.
66. Id. at 82.
67. Id. at 85.
68. Id.
69. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 778 (Alaska 1974).
70. Id. at 785.
71. The court flatly applied this three-part test without reference to any
source from which it derived this standard.  See id.  All three parts of this test
must be met in order to prohibit discovery.  See Gipson v. State, 609 P.2d 138
(Alaska 1980) (finding that the evidence at issue was incriminating and com-
pelled, but not testimonial, and therefore was discoverable).
72. Scott, 519 P.2d at 785.
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in criminal activities of such witness.”73  Finally, the court found
that since the discovery was required by a court order, it was in-
deed compelled.74
Addressing the U.S. Supreme Court’s “eventuality of disclo-
sure” argument, the Alaska court offered a counter-scenario in
which “the state’s case may be so weak that the defendant will
choose not to expose himself to further criminal liability by re-
vealing incriminating evidence that was nonetheless exculpatory of
the crime for that he stands charged.”75  The Scott court was simply
unwilling to be limited to a federal baseline which it perceived as
an insufficient protection of citizens’ rights.76  The court stated,
“We are not bound to follow blindly a federal constitutional con-
struction of a fundamental principle if we are convinced that the
result is based on unsound reason or logic.”77
In addition to being a sharp departure from the federal inter-
pretation of rights, Scott foreclosed the possibility of adopting
mandatory reciprocal discovery in Alaska.  Any change in discov-
ery requirements must not require disclosures that are testimonial,
incriminating, and compelled.  The subsequent efforts to enact re-
ciprocal discovery measures have merely challenged the founda-
tion of Scott and therefore have failed.78  Successful reform must
work within the Scott constraints while still providing for more fair,
even-handed criminal discovery.
IV. ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
Under the former versions of Rule 16, discovery in Alaska
was not reciprocal.  Instead, it provided for extensive discovery to
the defense, but the prosecution had to wait until the trial for
revelation of certain persons’ identities, testimonies, and reports.79
Despite the restrictions on discovery by the prosecution estab-
lished by Scott, Alaska has attempted moves toward a fairer, more
73. Id.
74. See id. at 786.
75. Id. at 787.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 783.
78. See infra Part IV.
79. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16 (1973).  Under this version of Rule 16, the
prosecutor was required to disclose the “names and addresses of persons known
by the government to have knowledge of relevant facts and their written or re-
corded statements.”  Id.  The prosecution was also required to disclose any state-
ments made by the defendant or any codefendant and any expert reports made in
relation to the case.  See id.  In return, the defendant was to provide notice of in-
tent to raise an insanity defense and court-ordered expert witness reports, and to
submit to nontestimonial identification procedures.  See id.
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reciprocal discovery.
A. Efforts from the Judiciary
In 1995, the Alaska Department of Law proposed a version of
reciprocal criminal discovery moderated by an “opt-in/opt-out”
provision.80  Defendants who agreed to opt-in would receive dis-
covery from the prosecution pursuant to that provided by Criminal
Rule 16. 81  In return, the defense would waive self-incrimination
privileges and would be required to present the prosecution with
more extensive discovery than they would be under Scott, includ-
ing a notice of defenses, names and addresses of potential wit-
nesses, statements from witnesses, and expert witness reports.82  A
defendant who chooses to opt out would lose access to discovery
from the prosecution provided by Criminal Rule 16 and would be
limited to the discovery rights under the Little Jencks Act.83  Under
this Act, which governs discovery during trial as opposed to pre-
trial, the prosecution is required to provide only statements made
by prosecution witnesses once those witnesses have testified either
in preliminary hearings or in the trial itself.84  With no other dis-
covery standards, this system would largely abrogate pretrial dis-
covery in the criminal context except for exculpatory evidence
which the prosecution is constitutionally bound to disclose.85
The majority of the Alaska Supreme Court Criminal Rules
Committee voted against adopting the opt-in/opt-out reciprocal
discovery proposal.  The Committee’s primary concern was the
problems created by defendants who choose to opt out.  The
Committee asserted in its report “that no incentive existed for a
defendant to choose to opt into such a discovery process.”86  To
substantiate this assertion, the report stated that
80. See Alaska Department of the Law, Proposed Rule Changes to Criminal
Rule 16, at 18 (1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Proposed Rule Changes].
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See ALASKA STAT. §§12.45.050-.080 (Michie 1996); see also Proposed Rule
Changes, supra note 80, at 18.  The “Little Jencks Act” was modeled after the
federal Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 et seq. (1994).  The Alaska Supreme Court
has previously held that the Alaska model does not conflict with Criminal Rule 16
as the Rule addresses pretrial discovery, while the Act speaks only to discovery
during trial.  See Putnam v. State, 629 P.2d 35, 44 n.19 (Alaska 1980).
84. See 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 95.
85. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
86. Memorandum from Marcia E. Holland, for the majority of the Alaska Su-
preme Court Criminal Rules Committee, to the Alaska Supreme Court 1 (Dec.
12, 1994) (on file with author) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material . . . to guilt.”).
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[a] majority of criminal defense attorneys contacted by committee
members indicated that they would prefer operating under an
opt-out procedure if given the choice between opt-in or opt-out
procedure.  Little incentive existed under the state’s proposal for
a defendant to choose to waive his/her privilege against self-
incrimination and opt into the reciprocal discovery process.87
Since the opt-in procedure was undesirable to the defense at-
torneys polled, the report then moved to the problems “which
arise when the criminal justice system operates solely or primarily
on discovery provided by the state under the provisions of the Lit-
tle Jencks Act.”88  Concerns included the potential for unreliable
results, conflicts of representation, mid-trial delays, and the prob-
ability of prosecution continuing to release discovery in the inter-
est of pre-indictment procedures.89
The Committee concluded by discussing the “broader impact
of the opt-out procedure on the smooth functioning of a criminal
justice system.”90  In its opinion, the opt-out discovery procedure
would have “a significant adverse effect on the court system.”91  In
particular, the report listed the difficulties faced by an opt-out de-
fendant who lacks vital information, a jury delayed by required
continuances, or a prosecution strained by an increasing number of
preliminary hearings.92
Under the proposal, the defendant who chooses to opt out of
reciprocal discovery has little access to discovery material impor-
tant to deciding trial strategy.  A defendant who lacks disclosure of
the evidence “lacks the perspective to make an informed decision
to either go to trial or not and the defense attorney lacks the evi-
dence to back up an explanation to a client concerning the client’s
chances for an acquittal at trial.”93  Without the materials for a
meaningful defense, the majority anticipated less negotiation and
pretrial resolution, resulting in more cases going to trial and
greater demands for juries.
The majority report predicted there would also be an adverse
impact on juries.  Mid-trial delays would frequently arise as defen-
dants request continuances to counter new evidence.  Trial lengths
would become less predictable.  These continuances would strain
the jurors’ ability to serve.  As one judge lamented, “it is very diffi-
cult to be able to hold on to a jury when a mid-trial delay of six
87. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 2.
89. See id. at 2-3.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id.
92. See id. at  4-5.
93. Id. at 4.
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weeks or more occurs.”94
Finally, the majority report predicted that if the proposal were
adopted, preliminary hearings would again become a discovery
tool.  Preliminary hearings were a frequent occurrence under for-
mer versions of Rule 16.95  In response to prosecutorial tactics, de-
fendants would use pretrial motions to gain discovery, a technique
common in federal courts.  Responding to these motions would
burden Alaska’s court systems and already-overworked prosecuto-
rial staffs.  In light of its findings, the majority of the Criminal
Rules Committee rejected the proposed rule, concluding that “opt-
in/opt-out reciprocal discovery procedures could result in disrup-
tive pretrial and trial practice and in burdening the system.”96
While the majority reflected a preference for the current, pro-
defendant system, the minority favored an approach that would ei-
ther restrict defendant access to materials or broaden prosecutorial
reach.97  The minority report favored an “opt-in” version of recip-
rocal discovery, finding it an “exchange of information” that would
“result in trials with more reliable results – i.e.[,] the guilty will not
go free because the accused sandbagged the prosecution.”98  Rais-
ing issue with the majority’s prediction of increased trial numbers,
the minority cited the federal court system as an example of effec-
tive reciprocal discovery.  According to the minority, “the number
of trials vs. pleas [under the federal reciprocal discovery system] is
not unmanageable.”99  The minority also asserted that the federal
courts have not seen a large number of mid-trial continuances dis-
rupting the judicial process.100  However, the minority provided no
empirical data to support this assertion.101
The minority suggested that the number of trials may actually
decrease when the “defendants’ chances of winning at trial by am-
bush are removed.”102  As for increased collateral attacks, it
pointed to the large percentage of convicted defendants already
filing for post-conviction relief and argued that the proposed rule
94. Id.
95. See id. at 5.
96. Id.
97. The crucial ideological division between the majority and minority reports
is evidenced by the fact that the majority was written by Assistant Public De-
fender Marcia E. Holland, while the minority report was written by Assistant At-
torney General Cynthia M. Hora.
98. Memorandum from Cynthia M. Hora, for the minority of the Alaska Su-
preme Court Criminal Rules Committee, to Christine Johnson, Court Rules At-
torney 2-3 (Dec. 8, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hora Memorandum].
99. Id. at 2.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
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“may change the specific complaints about a trial attorney’s per-
formance, but it will not have any impact on the number of post-
conviction relief applications filed.”103
In examining the merits of reciprocal discovery, the Commit-
tee as a whole addressed several issues crucial to advancing the
Alaskan criminal system toward a fairer discovery format.  How-
ever, the actual viability of reciprocal discovery in Alaska is still
unclear.  In discussing reform measures, the Committee focused on
the negative effects that defendants who opt out might encounter.
While analysis of these effects are necessary, the examination was
premature.  The majority report largely dismissed any notion that
defendants would actually opt in with regularity.  Its discussion re-
volved around why the Rule’s failure would be negative, rather
than discussing if the Rule would fail.  Neither side presented reli-
able or credible evidence to support its respective thesis.  Although
it may be true that the proposal’s effects are unknown or uncon-
sidered, both sides, rather than entertaining any true research or
investigation, drew conclusions based on their differing ideologies
of criminal law.
Both sides also predictably raised by implication the specter of
institutional competence: whether the ideological and political as-
pect of the debate appropriately belongs in judicial committees, or
whether such a question is best left to a more politically account-
able branch of government – the legislature.  Reciprocal discovery
proponents have argued that the movement has grown out of the
public backlash against crime and the perception that flaws in the
criminal justice system unduly favor the accused.104  The minority
drew on this sentiment in its statement that “[t]he public is de-
manding a fair trial for both the accused and the government.”105
This assertion, however, was presented on its own merits and was
not grounded in neutral, unbiased research.
Notwithstanding its rejection of reciprocal discovery, the
Criminal Rules Committee did  pass modifications to Criminal
Rule 16 in an attempt to broaden discovery as much as possible
within the limitations set by Scott.106  The revisions to the discovery
rule included mandatory defense disclosure of expert witnesses,
defenses, and physical evidence, while prosecution disclosure re-
103. Id.
104. See id. at 2; see also 1996 STANDARDS, supra note 1, at xv.  The ABA Dis-
covery Standards suggest that “[t]here has . . . been a growing recognition on the
state and federal levels that expanded pretrial discovery in criminal cases is bene-
ficial to both parties and promotes the fair administration of the criminal justice
system.” Id.
105. Hora Memorandum, supra note 98, at 2.
106. See generally Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 80.
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mained largely unchanged.107
Under the new Rule 16, defendants are required to present to
the prosecutor not only reports and statements of expert witnesses
(as was the previous practice), but also the names and addresses of
expert witnesses who are likely to be called.  Additionally, the de-
fense, at least ten days prior to trial, must “inform the prosecutor
of the defendant’s intention to rely upon a defense of alibi, justifi-
cation, duress, entrapment, or other statutory or affirmative de-
fense.”108  The previous rule had limited mandatory disclosure to
defendants asserting an insanity defense.109  Finally, the revisions
now require defendants to “turn over . . . any physical evidence of
the offense received by counsel.”110  The defense counsel could not
be “compelled to provide any information concerning the source
of the evidence” nor could the prosecutor “reveal the source of the
evidence to the jury.”111
Without regard to the specific discovery formats preferred,
both factions of the Committee focused on broadening the defen-
dant’s disclosures in an effort to achieve fairer, more liberal crimi-
nal discovery.  However, the Committee’s reform was limited to
the Scott restrictions; as the Committee’s report states, “Rule 16(c)
should be revised to require [only] as much disclosure as is permit-
ted by law.”112
But the new Criminal Rule 16 had little immediate impact; the
legislature, perhaps feeling unsatisfied by the Committee’s lack of
progress, attempted to resolve the matter by legislatively amending
Criminal Rule 16 the following year.
B. Efforts from the Legislature
The latest attempt to reform criminal discovery in Alaska was
the passage of Chapter 95 of the 1996 Session Laws, which
amended Criminal Rule 16 to expand the discovery required of de-
fendants.113  The amendments provided for mandatory reciprocal
discovery, including requiring the defense to furnish the identities
and addresses of all prospective witnesses.  Effective July 1, 1996,
this Act directly challenged the basic tenets of  Scott.
The most crucial revision to Criminal Rule 16, provision
(c)(1), mandated disclosure to the prosecution of “the names, ad-
dresses, and phone numbers . . . of persons the defendant is likely
107. See id.
108. Id. at 19.
109. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16 (1973).
110. Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 80, at 19.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 18.
113. 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 95, § 1.
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to call as witnesses.”114  The former version of Rule 16 required no
such disclosures from the defense.115  The new rule also required
notification “if the defendant is likely to rely upon a defense of al-
ibi, justification, duress, entrapment, or other statutory or affirma-
tive defenses.”116
The first judicial review of Chapter 95 found the revision to
Criminal Rule 16 unconstitutional.117  The state had charged David
Summerville with two counts of sexual assault and one count of
sexual abuse of a minor.118  Under the newly-amended version of
Criminal Rule 16, the state requested discovery information in-
cluding a list of alibi witnesses.119  Summerville sought a protective
order, claiming the disclosure of defense witnesses, the production
or inspection of statements of any prospective witnesses, and dis-
closure of an alibi location and witnesses all violated the Scott re-
strictions on prosecutorial discovery.120  The superior court agreed
and granted the protective order, concluding that “certain portions
of Rule 16(c) . . . stand in direct violation of Scott, which expressly
held that the Alaska Constitution’s bar against compulsory self-
incrimination forbids these forms of court-ordered defense disclo-
sure.”121
On review, the court of appeals affirmed.122  Dismissing the
state’s contentions that federal case law disagreed with Scott’s
holding, it stated that
[t]hese precedents decided under the [f]ederal Constitution,
have no direct effect on the Alaska Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of Alaska’s constitution.  They may, of course, provide occa-
sion for the Alaska Supreme Court to reexamine the decision it
reached . . . .  But unless and until the Alaska Supreme Court re-
vises Scott, its decision in that case remains binding on the supe-
rior court and on this court alike.123
In a brief, yet pointed, decision, the Alaska Supreme Court
upheld the court of appeals’s decision and explicitly declined to
overrule Scott.124  It declared the new discovery standards unconsti-
114. Id.
115. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c) (1973).
116. 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 95, § 1.
117. See State v. Summerville, 926 P.2d 465 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996), aff’d, 948
P.2d 469 (Alaska 1997).
118. See id. at 466.
119. See id. at 466-67.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 466-67.
122. See id. at 467.
123. Id.
124. See State v. Summerville, 948 P.2d. 469, 469-70 (Alaska 1997).
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tutional and reinstated the previous Alaska Criminal Rule 16.125
The court held that
[t]he decision in this case is controlled by Scott v. State, unless we
are persuaded to overrule Scott.126  In State v. Dunlop, we stated:
“We do not lightly overrule our past decisions. . . .  [I]t is a
‘salutary policy to follow past decisions.’ . . .  [W]here we are
‘clearly convinced the rule was originally erroneous or is no
longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good
than harm would result from a departure from precedent,’ we
will so depart.”  We are not persuaded that these standards are
met, at least with respect to Scott’s holding that the production
of the names of non-alibi witnesses and their statements cannot
be constitutionally compelled.  Because the reciprocal discovery
provisions enacted in section 1 of Chapter 95 SLA 1996 are
non-severable, and at least one of those provisions violates arti-
cle I, section 9 of Alaska’s constitution, the entire section is in-
valid.  The pre-existing version of Alaska Criminal Rule 16 must
remain in effect.127
C. Current Law
By declaring Chapter 95 unconstitutional, the Summerville
opinion reinstated the Committee’s Rule 16 as the operative
criminal discovery procedure for Alaska.128  That rule demands
greater disclosure by the defense, including notification of seem-
ingly all defenses, revelation of expert witness identities, and pro-
duction of all physical evidence held by the defense.129
125. See id.
126. Here, the court appears to suggest it might overrule Scott should a suffi-
cient argument be presented.  It is unclear what arguments would persuade the
court to overrule its decision in the present situation.  The brevity of the Summer-
ville opinion suggests the court does not view Scott as “originally erroneous.”  As
Scott itself defied a federal move away from broadened self-incrimination rights,
the “changed conditions” possibility seems slight.  Thus, we are left to believe the
strongest possibility of overruling Scott lies in showing “more good than harm
would result from a departure from precedent.”  Id. at 469.  The presentation of
results from other jurisdictions may well be the starting place for such a showing.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 470.
129. The Rule 16 amendments proposed by the Committee were adopted by
the Alaska Supreme Court, effective July 15, 1995.  See Alaska Supreme Court
Order No. 1191.  The amendments themselves largely affected discovery that the
accused was required to provide to the prosecution.
Under Rule 16(4) as amended, “the defendant [is to] inform the prosecutor of the
names and addresses of any expert witnesses the defendant is likely to call at trial.
Defendant shall also make available for inspection and copying any reports or
written statements of these experts.” ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(4).  The new Rule
16(5) requires that “the defendant shall inform the prosecutor of the defendant’s
intention to rely upon a defense of alibi, justification, duress, entrapment, or
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While not allowing for the discovery of alibi witness identities,
the Scott court did allow discovery of a defendant’s intent to use an
alibi defense.130 The court stated that it found “it difficult to con-
ceive how a notice of this particular defense, standing by itself,
might tend to be incriminating.”131  It seems probable that the addi-
tion of other defenses to the discovery requirement would follow a
similar evaluation and be upheld.
Providing the identity of expert witnesses also seems proper.
While facially similar to the discovery disallowed by Scott, the pro-
duction of expert witnesses is distinguishable.  Scott emphasized
that alibi witnesses may include “felons, perjurers, accomplices,
codefendants, or individuals under suspicion or police surveil-
lance” that “may tend to implicate [the accused] in the criminal ac-
tivities of such witness” and may provide “a link in the chain of
evidence.”132  Such potential problems do not exist within the con-
text of expert witnesses.  Hence, expert witness testimony, while
perhaps revealing, is not “incriminating” in the same way that alibi
witness testimony is.
V. LOOKING TO OTHER STATES’ MODELS FOR FUTURE EFFORTS
In the wake of Scott and Summerville, Criminal Rule 16 can-
not require that the defendant disclose evidence that is testimonial,
incriminating, and compelled.  But, if the required disclosure
meets only two of the three prongs, the Alaska Supreme Court’s
decision in Gipson v. State133 suggests such disclosure would not
                                                                                                                                
other statutory or affirmative defense.” Id. 16(5).  Under both of these amend-
ments, sanctions are provided for noncompliance.
Finally, the amended Rule 16(6) states that
[d]efense counsel shall turn over to the prosecutor any physical evidence
of the offense received by counsel.  If the physical evidence is received
from the attorney’s client or acquired as a direct result of information
communicated by the client, defense counsel may not be compelled to
provide any information concerning the source of the evidence or the
manner in which it was obtained.  In such cases, the prosecutor may not
reveal the source of the evidence to the jury.  If the source of the physi-
cal evidence is not the client or the client’s agent, defense counsel shall
reveal the manner in which the physical evidence was obtained unless
that information is otherwise prohibited.
Id. 16(6).
130. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 787 (Alaska 1974).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 785.
133. 609 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1980).  In Gipson, the court distinguished Scott,
finding that the compelled production of a firearm expert’s report satisfied all
prongs but the testimonial portion.  The court found the report to be more “akin
to evidence such as fingerprints, handwriting exemplars or photographs. . . .  The
non-testimonial nature of the challenged evidence is fatal to Gipson’s constitu-
tional argument.”  Id. at 1044 (citation omitted).
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violate the Scott standard.  Reform measures, therefore, should fo-
cus not on challenging the validity of Scott, but should focus on
sidestepping Scott by avoiding at least one of the three elements.
The Scott court spoke only to what it characterized as
“extensive pretrial prosecutorial discovery in criminal proceed-
ings.”134  While the court spoke against discovery as a “two-way
street,”135 it is unclear whether an “opt-in” reciprocal discovery sys-
tem would be contrary to the ruling.  Certainly any compelled re-
ciprocal discovery would violate Scott’s reading of the Alaska Con-
stitution.  However, if the defendant waives his Scott rights in
order to gain broader access to prosecution materials, the disclo-
sure would no longer be compelled.  Thus, it would appear that an
opt-in reciprocal discovery would satisfy the Scott holding.
As discussed previously, the Criminal Rules Committee re-
jected a reciprocal discovery proposal because defense attorneys,
informally polled, expressed the opinion that such discovery would
not be widely accepted by defendants.136  Such an informal, unsci-
entific poll should not be the basis for rejecting a progressive and
widely accepted legal movement.
Because Chapter 95 has been ruled unconstitutional, the
Alaska legislature must take the initiative and pass appropriate re-
ciprocal discovery measures.137  As demonstrated by their previous
attempt, the Criminal Rules Committee is unlikely to enact such
changes due to the members’ contrasting roles within the criminal
justice system.  Ideologies will not be set aside easily on such a cru-
cial matter.  If, as asserted by the minority report, the people of
Alaska are demanding changes in the criminal rules,138 the legisla-
ture is the proper forum for such changes.  However, regardless of
the public outcry, and short of amending the Alaska Constitution,
the legislative efforts must remain within the confines of the Scott
decision.
134. Scott, 519 P.2d at 785.
135. Id. at 784.
136. See supra Part IV.A.
137. The Alaska Constitution grants the primary responsibility for rule-making
to the Alaska Supreme Court with secondary rule-making to the legislature:
The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the ad-
ministration of all courts.  It shall make and promulgate rules governing
practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all courts.  These
rules may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the mem-
bers elected to each house.
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §15.
138. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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A. Difficulties in Adopting the California or ABA Models
The California rule139 can only serve as a model of pure recip-
rocal discovery but not the actual discovery regime that might be
enacted in Alaska.  Applying the Scott three-part test to the Cali-
fornia statute makes it clear that it would be deemed unconstitu-
tional in Alaska.  In particular, the required production of witness
lists140 parallels the disclosure required by Chapter 95, a require-
ment that did not withstand scrutiny under the Scott test, due to
the testimonial, incriminating, and compelled nature of the discov-
ery.141
Of particular significance to the present Alaska debate, the
ABA Standards require that “[i]f the defense intends to rely upon
a defense of alibi or insanity, the defense should notify the prose-
cution of that intent and of the names of the witnesses who may be
called in support of that defense.”142  This provision alone demon-
strates the difficulties facing Alaskan reform.  Although placed in
the Discovery Standards as merely “another set of witnesses to be
disclosed,” the list of alibi witnesses parallels those discovery re-
quirements in Scott that the supreme court found unconstitu-
tional.143  Any attempt to include a list of alibi witnesses in the re-
quired defense disclosures would require an opt-in procedure to
sidestep the Scott restrictions.
Notably, the ABA removed “opt-in” provisions found in the
“two-track” approach of the previous edition, choosing what it
deemed “a simpler approach which applies the same mandatory
discovery rules in all cases.”144  It is also noteworthy that while the
new Discovery Standards do not provide specific timing guide-
lines,145 jurisdictions should “impose time limits for discovery suffi-
ciently in advance of trial to give each party adequate time to use
the disclosed information to prepare its case.”146
An Alaskan measure might well follow the same legislative
pattern of specifically delineating the discovery materials required
by each party.  The difficulty in analogizing or closely tracking the
139. See supra Part II.B.
140. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 1997).
141. See State v. Summerville, 926 P.2d 465 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996), aff’d, 948
P.2d 469 (Alaska 1997).
142. 1996 STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 11-2.2(c).
143. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 786-87 (Alaska 1974) (holding that the
portion of the superior court’s order that requires production of alibi information
from the defendant offends the defendant’s state constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination).
144. 1996 STANDARDS, supra note 1, at xvi.
145. See id. § 11-4.1.
146. Id. § 11-4.1(a) commentary.
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enactments of any other jurisdiction stems from Alaska’s unique
expansion of self-incrimination rights.  No other state is required
to include an “opt-in” provision to overcome constitutional restric-
tions.  For this reason, the Alaska statute would be unique.  Opt-
ing-in, however, is not an untested concept in other jurisdictions.
B. North Dakota and Florida as Possible Opt-In Models
Several states continue to provide an opt-in component to
criminal discovery.  These states can be models for Alaskan at-
tempts to expand discovery while remaining within Scott’s expan-
sion of self-incrimination rights.  In examining two of these juris-
dictions, North Dakota and Florida, Alaskan reformers should
note the operation and structure of the opt-in provision and the
disclosure provided in situations where defendants choose not to
opt-in.
North Dakota, with a few notable exceptions, has followed the
national trend toward broader criminal discovery.  Prior to 1983,
criminal discovery “proceeded on an informal basis,” requiring
prosecutorial disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence only as
required by the Brady v. Maryland decision.147  In September of
1983, Rule 16 was amended to permit greater discovery, but only if
the defendant chose such discovery.148  Specifically, Rule
16(b)(1)(A) provides for disclosure of documents, tangible objects,
and reports of examinations and tests, but only “[i]f the defendant,
in writing, requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(C) or
(D).”149  The cited subdivision states that “[u]pon written request
of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney shall permit the defen-
dant to inspect and copy or photograph” an assortment of materi-
als, including virtually all related documents, examinations, and
tangible objects.150  After making the request, the defendant must
release to the prosecution the same sort of discovery articles.151
Besides providing for opt-in reciprocal discovery, the North
Dakota amendments broaden the discovery available to the prose-
cution, even if the defendant chooses not to opt-in.  For instance,
the defense must disclose all statements made by the defendant
and a copy of the defendant’s criminal record.152  Another inter-
esting feature of the North Dakota rule requires a “defendant who
147. 373 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1963) (holding that the defendant was not denied a
federal constitutional right when his trial was restricted to the question of pun-
ishment); see N.D.R. CRIM. P. 16 explanatory note.
148. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 16 explanatory note.
149. Id. 16(b)(1)(A).
150. Id. 16(a)(1)(C)-(D).
151. See id. 16(b)(1)(A)-(B).
152. See id.
WILLIAMS 07/17/98  9:38 AM
56 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [15:1
intends to offer evidence of an alibi defense . . . [to] serve written
notice upon the prosecuting attorney of that intention.”153  The rule
also requires the filing of a notice that states “the specific place or
places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of
the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses
upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish the alibi.”154
In a slightly clearer fashion, the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure also permit reciprocal discovery, should the defendant
choose it.  Through a system entitled “Notice of Discovery,” a
Florida defendant “may elect to participate in the discovery proc-
ess provided by these rules” by filing a notice with the court.155  The
rule further specifies that “[p]articipation by a defendant in the
discovery process, including the taking of any deposition by a de-
fendant, shall be an election to participate in discovery.”156
Once the discovery process is chosen, the defendant is re-
quired to furnish a number of items, including witness lists, state-
ments, and reports.157  Most notable, however, is the degree to
which the defendant is made available to the prosecution.  Having
submitted  to discovery, the court may require the defendant to
appear in a lineup, speak for identification by witnesses, be finger-
printed, pose for photographs, try on articles of clothing, permit
the taking of specimens of material from under the defendant’s
fingernails, permit the taking of samples of blood and hair, provide
handwriting samples, and submit to physical and mental inspec-
tions.158  In exchange for furnishing this information, the defendant
is eligible to receive similar information from the prosecution.159
Both the North Dakota and Florida versions of the opt-in re-
ciprocal discovery may be useful in selecting appropriate standards
for Alaskan measures.  The concept of a formal notice filing, com-
bined with certain acts that may be deemed acts of acceptance,
provide a structure and procedure worthy of consideration.  Fur-
ther, following the North Dakota example of providing broadened
discovery for the prosecution, even if the defendant decides not to
opt-in, may bring a stronger sense of fairness to any proposed rule.
One element that may not be duplicated, however, is the required
release of alibi witnesses from all defendants.  Should the defen-
dant not choose to opt-in to reciprocal discovery and thus waive
153. Id. 12.1(a).
154. Id.
155. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a).
156. Id.
157. See id. 3.220(d)(1).
158. See id. 3.220(c)(1).  These requirements are recognized by the rule to be
constrained by constitutional limitations.  See id.
159. See id. 3.220(b).
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article I, section 9 rights, the Scott decision would prohibit such a
requirement.160
Regardless of the specific provisions and system selected,
Alaskan efforts to enact reciprocal discovery statutes should bor-
row one aspect from the other states: restricting prosecution dis-
covery to the constitutional minimum unless the accused provides
discovery in return.  Within this debate, it must be remembered
that while discovery is widely used, and is now fully ingrained in
the judicial mindset, most discovery provided to the defense by the
prosecution is not constitutionally mandated.  Discovery may be
sharply curtailed from its present state.  When prosecution materi-
als are no longer regularly provided, reciprocal discovery becomes
much more attractive to the defendant.  Through the addition of
an opt-in provision, the reciprocity becomes not only attractive to
the defendant, but also constitutional under Scott v. State.
VI. CONCLUSION
Evolution and change, mitigated by the recognition of indi-
vidual rights, are fundamental aspects of the Western legal tradi-
tion.  The last twenty years have seen large changes in the area of
criminal procedure.  Whereas the middle of the century was char-
acterized by the extension, development, and refinement of indi-
vidual rights, the end of this era has brought a resurgence of public
demand for increased crime prevention and less favorable treat-
ment of criminal defendants.  With respect to pretrial discovery in
the criminal context, the trend is toward reducing defense access
and increasing prosecutorial access.  Such trends have not occurred
in Alaska because of  the expansion of criminal defendant’s rights
in Scott v. State.  Defendants in Alaska possess greater freedoms
and liberties, stemming not from federal decrees, but from state
judicial activism.  By declaring such opinions to be interpretations
of the Alaska Constitution, the Alaska Supreme Court’s decisions
are changeable only upon supreme court initiative or by the
amendment process.
However, this protection of personal freedoms and liberties
through the expansion of self-incrimination rights is hindering fair
criminal prosecution in Alaska.  The Department of Law’s recent
proposal examined reciprocal systems where opt-in provisions
would allow increased prosecutorial discovery while respecting
Scott’s expansion of individual rights, but the concept was dis-
missed largely for ideological reasons.  The legislative effort di-
rectly challenged the Scott  holding by amending Rule 16.  How-
ever, the Alaska supreme court upheld Scott and the attempt was
160. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alaska 1974).
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futile.  All previous attempts at reciprocal discovery have extended
the prosecutorial reach to items that the courts view as testimonial
and incriminating, and thus, in Alaska, not constitutionally subject
to be compelled during pretrial discovery.  The current version of
Rule 16 remains within the basic tenets of Scott but fails to expand
discovery to any significant degree.
In looking for areas in which to modify criminal procedure,
proponents ought to reconsider an opt-in reciprocal discovery sys-
tem.  They system should pass constitutional muster, under both
the federal and state constitutions, if it restricts defense discovery
to the constitutional and Little Jencks Act minimum should the de-
fendant choose not to opt-in.  Broad discovery would not be elimi-
nated, but placed behind a door that the defendant could open at
his or her option.  Discussions of this type have previously been
frustrated by insufficient data and argument in improper fora.  The
Alaska legislature should decide whether modified reciprocal dis-
covery is an appropriate method of criminal law reform.  With an
opt-in provision, Alaska could sidestep the court’s restrictions in
Scott, and rejoin the national legal trend towards more fair and
equal criminal discovery.
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